Good question. I noodled on it a bit and the answer I came to, unfortunately, expanded into what seems like a full deontological (i.e. duty-based) moral theory. But I don’t any to bury the lead…
My answer to the question, “Who is responsible for creating psychological safety (or anything)?” is this: Anyone who has the capacity to do something about it AND thinks they should.
Do with that what you will.
My fuller answer is something like this. To me, your question required a clear and confident use of the word “responsible.” Since it was a question in response to something I wrote, I indulged myself with the question, “What is responsibility?”—a topic I’ve tackled in previous articles.
It was worth diving in again because your question connected to something I was already trying to write about: how “responsibility tracks with capacity.”
I was never completely satisfied with that phrasing, though.
Here’s the simple conclusion: Responsibility belongs to anyone who has the capacity to do something about it AND thinks they should.
Three clarifications:
1. The “thinking” doesn’t need to be consciously identifiable. It can (and often does) show up as a subtle mind/body tension—something resisted or contracted away from. These symptoms are often more obvious than the belief itself. But underneath denial and avoidance strategies, there often remains a person’s own belief in their obligation.
2. Capacity is necessary because one’s own sense of responsibility isn’t a sufficient guide. As much as we need to integrate the subjective, we must also connect it to the question of capacity. Otherwise, we’d be sanctioning every depressive’s sense of guilt for failing to save the world. “Capacity” is open to interpretation, of course, but it provides a useful balance.
3. This doesn't solve it because it naturally leads to a key question: At what point does someone actually become responsible? And what does that transition feel like?
If a person doesn’t think they should do something, I may believe they should feel differently—but that belief alone violates the “Dammit” principle. They don’t feel it, and therefore, they are not responsible in this moment. I can think all I want about their responsibility, but none of my thinking can bridge the gap into convincing the universe to hold them accountable.
However—and this is the important bit—I can work to make them responsible by bringing into their awareness the conditions necessary to generate a sense that they should act.
So how do we define this properly? Responsibility tracks with capacity—but not just that. It’s capacity and felt responsibility. One’s own felt sense of duty naturally obligates. That obligation may resolve in countless ways, only a few of which involve taking direct action.
Kant’s categorical imperative expresses this same sentiment—it’s oriented around an agent’s own felt will. That is, act in accordance with your own will or sensibility that your action would be a universally right action for any other person in the same circumstances. This orients the agent toward moral thinking, which has value beyond the specific instance.
So, who is responsible for creating psychological safety? Anyone who has the capacity to do something about it AND thinks they should. :)
Hey Peter,
Good question. I noodled on it a bit and the answer I came to, unfortunately, expanded into what seems like a full deontological (i.e. duty-based) moral theory. But I don’t any to bury the lead…
My answer to the question, “Who is responsible for creating psychological safety (or anything)?” is this: Anyone who has the capacity to do something about it AND thinks they should.
Do with that what you will.
My fuller answer is something like this. To me, your question required a clear and confident use of the word “responsible.” Since it was a question in response to something I wrote, I indulged myself with the question, “What is responsibility?”—a topic I’ve tackled in previous articles.
It was worth diving in again because your question connected to something I was already trying to write about: how “responsibility tracks with capacity.”
I was never completely satisfied with that phrasing, though.
Here’s the simple conclusion: Responsibility belongs to anyone who has the capacity to do something about it AND thinks they should.
Three clarifications:
1. The “thinking” doesn’t need to be consciously identifiable. It can (and often does) show up as a subtle mind/body tension—something resisted or contracted away from. These symptoms are often more obvious than the belief itself. But underneath denial and avoidance strategies, there often remains a person’s own belief in their obligation.
2. Capacity is necessary because one’s own sense of responsibility isn’t a sufficient guide. As much as we need to integrate the subjective, we must also connect it to the question of capacity. Otherwise, we’d be sanctioning every depressive’s sense of guilt for failing to save the world. “Capacity” is open to interpretation, of course, but it provides a useful balance.
3. This doesn't solve it because it naturally leads to a key question: At what point does someone actually become responsible? And what does that transition feel like?
If a person doesn’t think they should do something, I may believe they should feel differently—but that belief alone violates the “Dammit” principle. They don’t feel it, and therefore, they are not responsible in this moment. I can think all I want about their responsibility, but none of my thinking can bridge the gap into convincing the universe to hold them accountable.
However—and this is the important bit—I can work to make them responsible by bringing into their awareness the conditions necessary to generate a sense that they should act.
So how do we define this properly? Responsibility tracks with capacity—but not just that. It’s capacity and felt responsibility. One’s own felt sense of duty naturally obligates. That obligation may resolve in countless ways, only a few of which involve taking direct action.
Kant’s categorical imperative expresses this same sentiment—it’s oriented around an agent’s own felt will. That is, act in accordance with your own will or sensibility that your action would be a universally right action for any other person in the same circumstances. This orients the agent toward moral thinking, which has value beyond the specific instance.
So, who is responsible for creating psychological safety? Anyone who has the capacity to do something about it AND thinks they should. :)
Who is responsible for creating psychological safety?